Non prioritized reasoning in intelligent agents by Falappa, Marcelo Alejandro & Simari, Guillermo Ricardo
Non Prioritized Reasoning in Intelligent Agents
Marcelo A. Falappa Gerardo I. Simari
Departamento de Ciencias e Ingenier´ıa de la Computacio´n
Universidad Nacional del Sur. Av. Alem 1253, (8000) Bah´ıa Blanca, Argentina
Tel: ++54 291 4595135 - Fax: ++54 291 4595136
{mfalappa,gis}@cs.uns.edu.ar
1 Introduction and Background
The design of intelligent agents is greatly influenced by the many diﬀerent models that exist to
represent knowledge. It is essential that such agents have computationally adequate mechanisms
to manage its knowledge, which more often than not is incomplete and/or inconsistent. It is
also important for an agent to be able to obtain new conclusions that allow it to reason about
the state of the world in which it is embedded.
It has been proven that this problem cannot be solved within the realm of Classic Logic.
This situation has triggered the development of a series of logical formalisms that extend the
classic ones. These proposals often carry the names of Nonmonotonic Reasoning, or Defeasible
Reasoning. Some examples of such models are McDermott and Doyle’s Nonmonotonic Logics,
Reiter’s Default Logic, Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic, McCarthy’s Circumscription Model, and
Belief Revision (also called Belief Change). This last formalism was introduced by Ga¨rdenfors
and later extended by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson [1, 4].
In particular, Belief Revision has as its main objective to model the dynamics of knowledge,
that is, the way in which an agent’s knowledge must be updated when it encounters new
information. In other words, in what way must an agent’s model of the world be updated when
its sensors obtain up to date information about the environment? In this sense, it is in the field
of Cognitive Robotics where belief revision finds its most appropriate application. Agents (be
them physical or software) must have the necessary flexibility in order to change their beliefs
because they are the main motivators of their actions. The idea of belief revision finds an
example close to our basic intuitions in the legal environment, where the promulgation of a
new law demands that some of the rest be “revised” and others removed to keep the set of laws
consistent. In this example, the three basic operations of belief revision known as expansion,
contraction, and revision are mapped into promulgation, derogation, and amendment of laws.
These same ideas are also applicable to environments that are closer to the computational realm,
such as the use of communication protocols where new protocols can be added (expansion),
withdrawn (contraction), or a set of them be replaced by one or more (revision).
Revisions are the most commonly used change operators because they allow a sentence α to
be included into a set K, generating a new set K I, preserving consistency in the new set. The
traditional revision models are prioritized, that is, they give priority to new information over
the information that is already part of their knowledge. This property does not seem plausible
in the real world, because in many cases it is not reasonable to give priority to information just
because it is new.
In non prioritized models, it is possible for new information not to be accepted. Such new
information can be rejected or accepted only after a debate process. In this sense, there exists
a variety of diﬀerent non prioritized belief revision models, among which are David Makinson’s
Screened Revision [7, 6], Sven Ove Hansson’s consolidation and semirevision operators [5],
Andre´ Fuhrmann’s merge operations [3] and Falappa’s [2] recently formulated revisions by sets
of sentences. In this last work, a new kind of nonprioritized revision operator based on the use of
explanations is presented. It is argued that an agent, before incorporating information which is
inconsistent with its knowledge, should request an explanation that supports this information.
An explanation is characterized as being composed of an explanans (set of sentences supporting
a certain belief), and an explanandum (the final conclusion).
A classic example of this situation is the following: Suppose that a person believes that
(α) all mammals can jump and (β) Titus is a mammal. Thus, he will believe (δ) Titus can
jump. Later on, another person states that Titus cannot jump. If δ is dropped, then α or β will
have to be dropped as well. However, it does not seem to be rational to incorporate external
beliefs without pondering them. An explanation should be required in order to incorporate
such information, especially in the case where it contradicts the previously maintained set of
beliefs.
In our case, the person should demand an explanation for ¬δ. One possibility is that he is
given an explanation such as: Titus cannot jump because he is an elephant, and elephants are
mammals, but they cannot jump. Now, the sentences in the explanans can be used to evaluate
the new piece of information before it is incorporated.
2 Objectives
This research is directed towards the definition of non prioritized belief revision operators in
knowledge based systems, using a declarative programming language as a representation lan-
guage and inference mechanism. Once formally defined, these operators will be implemented
in knowledge based systems, information systems, knowledge bases, etc. Their implementation
is focused on learning the computational problems associated with this type of operators.
The theory of belief change assumes that an agent’s beliefs are represented by belief sets (sets
of sentences closed under logical consequence) or belief bases (arbitrary sets of sentences). It is
clear the, in computational applications, one must opt for finite belief bases. New information,
which is called epistemic input is sometimes represented by a sentence of the language or an
arbitrary set of sentences.
The revision operator proposed in [2] allows a non prioritized revision in the following way:
• The epistemic input is a single sentence with an explanation for it.
• The explanation (a set of sentences with some constraints) is added to the original set,
maybe resulting in a temporarily inconsistent set.
• Then the consistency is restored by a contraction by falsum.
This mechanism could be applied in some real life situations or dialogs between agents. The
goal of our investigation is to develop new operators of this type for multiagent systems.
For example, suppose an agent wishes to make an investment of up to $20.000, so he goes
out and scouts the market to see where he can invest his money. A variety of salesmen oﬀer
him: a car for $16.000, a piece of land for $21.000, and an apartment for $30.000. Now, the
agent has to make a decision among the three options (if any); each of the salesmen gave him
good reasons to buy their item:
• The car is a good bargain, but its disadvantage is that it loses value by the day.
• The piece of land could be worth double what is being paid just a few years from now;
nevertheless, if the agent is not planning on investing more money on the land after buying
it, it may not be the best option.
• The apartment is very appealing: even though its value is not likely to go up, the agent
can make money out of it by renting it to others. It has a disadvantage though: its price
is well over the amount the agent initially expected to spend.
The agent is now faced with a revision of his knowledge. Before he went shopping, he
expected to spend $20.000, even though he actually has $28.000 to spend. There are two
possible situations that can arise when the agent revises his beliefs:
• He decides not to change his spending limit.
• He decides to rise his spending limit to try and buy one of the more expensive oﬀers.
In the first case, once the salesmen see that the agent will not take the oﬀer, they will also
revise their knowledge, which can lead to a better oﬀer for the agent and a good profit for the
salesmen.
In the second case, the agent may decide that he wants to buy the apartment. Even
though this is initially inconsistent with his knowledge (he has $28.000, and the apartment
costs $30.000), he adopts the wish anyway, because he is also planning on bargaining with the
salesman in order to get a better price.
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